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 Do Politicians Serve the One Percent? 
Evidence in OECD Countries. 
 
Pablo Torija1 
 
Abstract 
Present social movements, as “Occupy Wall Street” or the Spanish “Indignados”, claim 
that politicians work for an economic elite, the 1%, that drives the world economic policies. 
In this paper we show through econometric analysis that these movements are accurate: 
politicians in OECD countries maximize the happiness of the economic elite. In 2009 
center-right parties maximized the happiness of the 100th-98th richest percentile and 
center-left parties the 100th-95th richest percentile. The situation has evolved from the 
seventies when politicians represented, approximately, the median voter. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
 
 The financial crisis which had  broke out in the USA in 2007 turned into a world wide 
economic disaster by 2008. That year, thousands of citizens from Greece, Portugal and 
Iceland expressed their anger against politicians and their economic management. Three 
years later, and with the Arab spring in between, around 7 millions of Spanish “indignados” 
started a massive demonstration campaign. By September 2011, the outrage against 
politicians had already crossed the Atlantic and the “Occupy Wall-Street” movement 
claimed for a refunding of the economic and political system in the USA.  
 Civil society from all OECD countries participated in a world-wide coordinated 
demonstration on 15th October 2011. Their activists claimed that they are not enjoying real  
democratic systems. They complained that politicians do not follow the wishes of the 
majority but the dictates of an economic elite, and considered that their politicians were  
excluding the remaining 99% of the population. 
 These movements are inspired by the work of several researchers (eg. Sirorta 
2007, Taibbi 2010, George 2011, or Stiglitzt 2011) who suggest that political parties in 
developed societies are not any longer a fair representation of the citizens' wills but an 
instrument of the rich. For instance, Colin Crouch claims in his book 'Post-democracy' 
(Crouch, 2004) that developed countries enjoy only pseudo-democratic regimes as they 
lack truly representative elections. Crouch considers that this evolution is due the relative 
impoverishment of the workforce and labor unions after the seventies as a main cause of 
this situation. Another researcher Slavov Žižek, suggests that ecological disasters are not 
the only occurrences that may be used to impose the rule of the economic elite, as 
theorized by Naomi Klein (Klein 2007). The economic crisis itself can be instrumented to 
set economic rules which favor the interests of the richest (Žižek 2009).  
 Economic journals are full with papers which explain how interest groups can take 
advantages of a large variety of undemocratic channels. Democratic deficits are linked 
with the action of lobbies (Fellini and Merlo 2003, or Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007.), 
media (Prat and Strömberg, 2011 or Edmond, 2011), public prosecution (Alt and Lassen, 
2010 or Torija 2011), rent extraction (Dreher and Schneider, 2010. or Ferraz and Finan, 
2011.), etc... Researches who have studied these aspects in depth found out that many of 
them directly affect OECD democracies. 
 On the other hand, several important research institutes share a totally different 
view. Freedom House (FH), National Center of Competence in Research (NNCR), Centre 
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for Systemic Peace (CSP), and the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (WGI) create 
annual indexes and reports about the democratic quality of the developed world. All their 
indexes use several panels of experts and statistical data, and they coincide on the 
strength and robustness of the democratic systems in all OECD countries. 
 For instance, according to FH “it is unlikely that Europe’s democratic standards will 
suffer serious setbacks in the wake of the ongoing debt crisis” (Freedom House 2012). 
NNCR similarly concludes in one of its reports: “Contrary to the contemporary political 
discourse, the results show that there is no evidence of an overall crisis or a decline in the 
quality of democracy” (Bühlmann, M. et al, 2011). From a quantitative point of view, they 
show an improvement in the quality of democratic representation of OECD countries 
during the period 1990 -2007. 
 Another index which has quantified the quality of developed democracies for a long 
period is Polit IV from CSP. The index has a 20 point scale and it has continually increased 
for OECD countries from 1981 till 2009, with the exception of Belgium that lost two points 
due to problems in forming a government. Finally, WGI finds slight decreases in both 
“Voice and Accounting” and “Goverment Effectivenes” indexes for the period 1996-2009 in 
OECD countries, but these reductions are statistically insignificant (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2009). 
 These examples illustrate the important divergences between several institutes, 
authors and citizens when talking about the quality of democracy. This paper aims to be a 
contribution to the debate. 
 Concretely, the paper will try to describe the level of representation of developed 
democracies and analyze the validity of the theories of Collin Crouch. The paper will study 
whether parties in government satisfy the desires of the majority of the society or if they 
focus on the interest of the rich. It shows the evolution of the political representation and it 
also discusses the correlations between the level of representation and the power of the 
working-class. 
 To do so, we will combine the information about happiness and income of 
individuals from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey 2009) and  the The 
Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-1999 (Schmitt. 2001) with the Potrafke's 
ideology index, which shows the ideology of a given government in a particular country 
(Potrafke, 2009). The final database covers 1981 to 2009 and uses more than 160,000 
surveys on 24 rich OECD countries. Through econometric analysis, we can analyze how 
the interests of particular citizens are fulfilled by politicians. We will show how the policies 
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implemented by different governments evolved and how they maximize the happiness of 
the economic elite in 2009. Through extrapolation we can show also how politicians 
represented the median voter around the seventies. 
 The paper is organized as follows. First, we explain the theory of post-democracy 
and we synthesize the ideas of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who modeled it in 
economic terms. In section 2, we describe the econometric model, its characteristics and 
the variables used. The results are presented in section 3 and they are discussed in 
section 4. At the end, we include a conclusion section that summarizes the paper. 
 
SECTION 1: THEORY 
1.1  Post-democracy 
 Collin Crouch summarized in his book “Post-democracy” several years of research 
in Northern democracies. According to the author, the power of the working-class in rich 
countries has evolved in a parabolic way. After the Second World War their power was in a 
minimum, but workers started to gain power and representation during two or three 
decades reaching their peak in the seventies. By that time, they had managed to bring 
their political agendas to different governments. Those governments implemented 
Keynesian policies which robust the access of workers to public and private goods. The 
situation started to change in the seventies when the companies displaced the activities of 
manual workers to the periphery. Little by little, all governments shifted their policies to 
favor large transnational corporations. The labor unions were weakened and the power of 
workers declined. 
 The quality of democratic representation also evolved in a parabolic trajectory. In 
the seventies, different parties favored different individuals according to the party's 
ideological background, but this situation changed later. According to the author,  
politicians only represent the economic elite now-a-days. Therefore. elections certainly 
occur in rich countries but they lack real representation. 
 
1.2  Modeling post-democracy 
 Acemoglu and Robinson wrote in their paper “Persistence of powers, elites and 
institutions” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), a mathematical model which fits with the 
theory exposed by Crouch. We will try to summarize the intuition behind this paper: 
 In their model there is a large number of worker-citizens and smaller group of elite-
individuals. Both groups compete to establish economic institutions which might favor one 
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group or the other. The authors analyze the existence of a “captured democracy”, when 
democratic institutions are created but the economic elite is able to monitor them and 
impose their favorite set of economic institutions. Whether the elite is able to capture the 
democratic process is a bargaining process between their power, PE, and the power of the 
worker-citizens, PC. In their model the power of the elite is a positive function of the rents 
that they extract from the total national rent PE = f(R/Y) and the power of the workers is a 
positive function of their contributions to obtain political power PC = f(θ). The democratic 
institutions would favor the economic elite when PE >> PC.  
 As we see, there are many similarities between this model and the ideas presented 
by Crouch: The possibility of existing unrepresentative democracies and the role of the 
power of the working-class. Both studies propose an interesting empirical question: the 
existence of political institutions which benefit the economic elite is correlated with the 
rents of this elite and the contributions of workers to the bargaining power. 
 Although Acemoglu and Robinson do not use their model to analyze the situation of 
rich countries, we will use their theoretical framework for empirical research in OECD 
countries. Namely, we will consider the percentage of national rents as wages and the 
percentage of workers in labor unions to measure the political power of elite and the 
contributions of workers to the political bargain. We will analyze whether these variables 
are correlated with the quality of representation in OECD democracies. 
 
SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY 
2.1  Estimation of political representation 
 The first step is to measure the quality of political representation. We will try to 
quantify the income level of the individual which different political parties are representing. 
Whether she is a rich individual, the median individual or a poor individual. The 
econometric regression is inspired in the traditional downsian model (Downs, 1957). Using 
the notation of Patty, Snyder, and Ting (2008): 
 Let be K political parties that must choose a policy xk which they will implement if 
they are in power. xk  is characterized in the set of real numbers X. 
 There is a number N of i voters. Each voter has an income yi and a favorite policy,  
τi, related to this income. The function h identifies this relation, h(yi ) =  τi . The set of τi is Τ = 
X. 
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 The utility of the voters is given by a function of their income f(yi) and the distance 
between their preferred policy and xk the policy selected by the party k in government: 
ui ( τi , xk) = f(yi) - Ωk ·( τi - xk)2 
 Where Ωk is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if party k is in power and 0 
otherwise. According to Downs, it may be the case that all the political parties will 
converge to the preferred policy of the median voter and xk = x. The intuition of the model 
can be seen in the next graph: 
 
<<GRAPH 1>> 
 
2.2 Econometric model 
 The paper will try to identify the positions of the K parties in the X set. We start by 
grouping the positions of the K parties in different ideology families: 
K = IDEO = { Right, Center-Right, Center, Center-Left, Left} 
 Let's assume the linear transformation τi = d·yi  and f(yi) = a·yi + b·y2i  : 
ui ( yi , xk) = a·yi + b·y2i - Ωk· ( d·yi - xk)2 
 The aim is to find the level of y that maximizes the second part of the last part of the 
equation for the different K ideologies once they are in power. We define this level as yk*. 
Even if d and xk are unobservable, it is still possible to compute yk* but first we have to 
estimate the function: 
ui,c,t=β0+ β1·yi,c,t + β2·y2i,c,t + βk , 3·Ωk  + βk , 4·Ωk ·yi,c,t + βk,5·Ωk·y2i,c,t + γ·Mi,c,t +ei,c,t 
 where M is a set of controls e the error term, and the sub-indexes c and t account 
for country and time, respectively. 
 We can imagine that richer individuals have more utility in general. That part of the 
theoretical model will be estimated with f(y) =  β1·yi,c,t + β2·y2i,c,t                              
 We define the rest of the equation as PUk. Namely, the utility provided by the party k 
when she is in power: 
PUk = βk , 3· Ωk   + βk , 4· Ωk· yi,c,t + βk,5 ·Ωk ·y2i,c,t  
 In the database we have observations for Center-Right (CR), Center (C) and 
Center-Left. Therefore we could expand the previous function as: 
 
     PUk =   β CR, 3· ΩCR   + βCR , 4· ΩCR· yi,c,t + βCR,5 ·ΩCR ·y2i,c,t + 
     
      
β
 C, 3 · ΩC    + βC, 4 · ΩC · yi,c,t + βC,5  ·Ωc ·y2i,c,t + 
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                 β
 CL, 3· ΩCL   + βCL , 4· ΩCL· yi,c,t + βCL,5 ·ΩCL ·y2i,c,t + 
 
 then, we can find the level of income that maximize each k = {CR, C, CL}  political 
party by applying the first order condition to PUk : 
yk*: ∂ PUk  / ∂ y  =  0  
yk* = - βk , 4 / ( 2 · βk , 5) 
 In this way we could identify the different yk*, which is the aim of the paper. 
Unfortunately, this procedure generates serious problems with the brant-test (see Section 
2.4) and alternatives must be considered. 
 Concretely, to overcome this problem we have assigned numeric values for the 
different K ideologies. We have created a new variable called ideo, which is equal to one if 
Right parties are in government, two if Center-Right parties are in government, etc: 
ideo = {1,2,3,4,5} 
 We have restated the previous model as: 
ui ( yi , xk) = a·yi + b·y2i - ( ideo + ideo2) ·( d·yi - xk)2 
 and we can estimate it: 
ui,c,t= β0  + β1·yi,c,t+β2·y2i,c,t+ β 3·ideoct+β 4·ideo2ct+β5·ideoct yi,c,t+β6·ideoct·y2i,c,t +            β7 
·ideo2ct·yi,c,t +γ·Mi,c,t +ei,c,t 
 This econometric model will also identify the yideo*. In order to help the reader with 
the understanding of the model, we will show a graphical representation of the role played 
by each variable: 
 
<< GRAPH 2>> 
 
 
 We can see the function that links income with utility without political action f(y) and 
three possible parabolic lines for three different values of ideology. The y*(ideo) are the 
values that maximize each different political party. Deliberately, we have omitted the 
variable  ideo2 ·y2 but we will explain this decision later.  
 We estimate the values of  yideo*,  first by defining the function PUideo as: 
 PUideo = β 3 ·ideoct+β 4 ·ideo2ct+β5 ·ideoct ·yi,c,t+β6 ·ideoct·y2i,c,t +β7 ·ideo2ct ·yi,c,t  
 and solving 
y*(ideo): ∂ PUideo  / ∂ y  =  0  
 we obtain: 
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y*(ideo)= - (β
 5+ β 7 ·ideo  )/ ( 2 · β6) 
 There are two important notes to this formulation. First, the inclusion of the variable 
ideo2 in   ui ( yi , xk) = a·yi + b·y2i - ( ideo + ideo2) ·( d·yi - xk)2 is necessary in order to obtain 
different peaks for different ideologies. And second, it is important to notice that here the 
distance y*(ideo) -  y*(ideo+1) = β
 7 is constant for all values of ideo. We have called this 
assumption the symmetry-assumption and we have discussed it in detail later on. 
Obviously, if  β7  = 0, then y*(ideo) = y* 
 We can extend the empirical model to analyze how y* evolves across time, and due 
to the effect of other variables. Given: 
F(y, ideo)=β1·yi,c,t+β2·y2i,c,t+ β 3·ideoct+β 4·ideo2ct+β5·ideoct yi,c,t+β6·ideoct·y2i,c,t 
+β7·ideo2ct·yi,c,t  
 We will calculate: 
ui,c,t= F(y, ideo) + δ·ti,c,t ·ideoct·yi,c,t + η·P·ideoct·yi,c,t+γ·Mi,c,t +ei,c,t 
 where: t is a year variable. P is a vector with values for the macro-economic 
variables of interest: The percentage of national rent paid as wages (wagessh), and 
participation in labor unions (labor). 
 We have also added other control variables that interact simultaneously with 
ideology and income, namely: Gini index (gini), GDP per capita (gdp), unemployment 
(unemp), turnout in the last elections (turnout), economic growth (growth), percentage of 
population with colleague education (unieduc). M will include the interactions between 
variables t and P with ideo and income.  
 The new y* are defined by: 
y*(ideo)= - (β
 5+ β 7 ·ideoc,t +δ·ti,c,t + η·P  ) / ( 2·β6) 
 Now, time (t) and the set of macro-economic variables (P) determine also the 
platform of the different parties when they are in government.  
 
2.3 Independent Variables 
 The period of study goes from 1981 till 2009. There is a total of 24 OECD countries 
analyzed. Some countries have been surveyed twice and present around 2.000 
observations (eg. New Zealand), and some of them have been surveyed ten times (eg. 
Great Britain). It is possible to find a list of years and when where they surveyed in the 
appendixes (APPENDIX 1).  
 Income is a key variable which is measured with different scales in both databases. 
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The most recurrent way of measuring income in both databases was using an 11-steps 
scale. Therefore, we have converted all the other scales to fit the 11-steps scale. If a given 
scale had N steps we have divided each n step between N and we have multiplied the 
result by 11. The final scale for the income variable is therefore in the interval (0,11] 
 Government ideology is measured with the Potrafke's ideology index. It is described 
as follows:  
“This index places the cabinet on a left-right scale with values between 1 and 
5. It takes the value 1 if the share of governing right wing parties in terms of 
seats in the cabinet and in parliament is larger than 2/3, and 2 if it is between 
1/3 and 2/3. The index is 3 if the share of center parties is 50%, or if the left 
wing and right wing parties form a coalition government that is not dominated 
by one side or the other. The index is symmetric and takes the values 4 and 5 
if the left wing parties dominate.” (Potrafke, 2009). 
 The databases do not have observations on the most extreme cases, 1 and 5. Only 
the values 2, 3 and 4 are present in the final data analyzed. 
 Other macro economic variables belonging to the vector P comes from the 
databases of World Bank, Eurostat and OECD. 
 The final analysis has +100.000 interviews for those regressions that consider only 
the World Values Survey (WVS) and +160.000 for those which use WVS with Schmitt 2011 
in a merged database. A detailed summary of the variables can be found in the 
appendixes (APPENDIX 2). 
 
2.4 Dependent variable: Level of Happiness. 
 There is a large literature dealing with the concept of utility and how to measure it. 
In the last decade psychologists and sociologist have proposed certain ways of obtaining a 
self-reported level of utility (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). There are two ways of measure 
indirectly utility, one is to ask people for their level of “happiness” and the other to ask for 
their level of “satisfaction with life”. 
 Many authors presuppose that both measurements are identical (Gundelach and 
Kreiner, 2004). Others claim that the level of happiness is the correct way of measuring 
utility (Lane 2000), and consider satisfaction as the distance between aspirations and 
achievements (Campbell et al. 1976). The distance between aspirations and achievements 
may depend on the policies of former governments, and we are trying to estimate the 
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political position of present governments. Additionally, the number of observations 
containing the answer to the question about happiness are 50% more than the those 
containing the answer to the question about the level of satisfaction. Consequently, we 
consider the level of happiness as dependent variable. Therefore, the different values of y* 
represent the happiness of which individuals are maximizing the politicians. 
 There are some problems when we use happiness as a dependent variable. 
Happiness is an emotional state which depends in several factors ranging from weather to 
health. The capacities of a government to influence happiness are limited but, as we will 
show, there is an impact of the political decisions of governments on the happiness of their 
citizens. 
 The level of happiness and other micro-level data are collected from World Values 
Survey (2009) and The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-1999 (Schmitt. 2001). 
The latest only includes information about individual's happiness for EU countries during 
the period 1981-1986. This may create a selection-bias problem and we have to take the 
results that includes the Eurobarometer with caution. 
 Additionally, both databases are not completely identical and we had to carry some 
transformations. For instance both databases ask for the level of happiness. Respondents 
could choose four different answers in the WVS: {“Very happy”, “Quiet Happy”, “Not very 
happy”, “Not happy at all”} and only three in Schmitt (2001) {“Very happy”, “Happy”, “Not 
happy”}. Table 1, shows the distribution of these answers. 
<<Table 1>> 
 In order to handle this discrepancy we have carried out two sets of regressions. The 
first one only with the observations of the WVS, which measures happiness with has a 4-
steps scale. The other one, combines WVS and Schmitt (2001). It considers “Not very 
happy” and “Not happy at all” from WVS as the answer “Not happy” in Schmitt (2001), 
therefore it measures happiness with a 3-steps scale. 
 Moreover, there are several problems related with the use of self-reported 
happiness. Concretely, World Values Survey asks: “Taking all things together, would you 
say you are:”.  We can name the possible set of answers as J:  
J = {“Very happy”, “Quiet Happy”, “Not very happy”, “Not happy at all”}.  
 As the possible answers lack cardinality, it is necessary to treat them with ordinal 
models. The standard procedure is to calculate J -1 ordinary binomial models.: 
logit [P (Y ≤ j |x)] =  αj +  β j 'x                    j = 1 … J-1  
 If βj =β for all j, then we will have a continuous latent variable underlining Y (Agresti, 
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2000). We can denote that variable as Y*. We show the relation between Y and Y*  in 
Graph 3 (adapted from Agresti, 2000.) 
<<GRAPH 3>> 
 
 Obviously, only continuous variables can be derived. Therefore, βj =β is a necessary 
condition of the econometric model. We can test whether βj =β by implementing a Brant 
test (Brant, 1990). This requirement supposes, obviously, a strong limitation to the 
research. 
 The procedure to obtain an unbiased and differentiable set of variables has been 
the following: First we carried out an ordinal logistic regression, then we have performed 
the Brant test (Long and Freese 2001) and finally, in case of rejecting the null hypothesis 
of non-parallel lines, we have performed a ordinal general logit model with the weights and 
heteroskedasticity function indicated in the appendixes (APPENDIX 3). 
 
2.5 Regressions 
 The result table shows six different regressions. They are labeled as BASIC-4, 
BASIC-3, YEAR-4, YEAR-3 , NOCO-4 COMP-4.  
 In the BASIC regressions, y* are fixed. YEAR regressions include the variable 
year·income·ideo that allows for changes of y* over time. The NOCO regression calculates 
the influence of labor union affiliation (labor·income·ideo) and percentage of rents payed 
as wages (wagessh·income·ideo) with y*. It does not include other variable interacting with 
income·ideo which may work as controls. The COMP regression computes the interactions 
between y* with time and the complete vector of macro-variables P = {(gini), (gdp), 
(unemp), (turnout), (growth), (unieduc)}.  The numeric suffixes (ie. {3,4}) indicate the 
number of steps of happiness, the dependent variable.  
 Problems related with the parallel-line assumption arise when including all the 
controls. BASIC, and YEAR regressions do not have all of them, but the controls 
eliminated were all insignificant. These eliminated controls are: unieduc, and the 
interactions, unieduc·ideo, unieduc·income, labor·income and gini·income. In the 
appendixes (APPENDIX 3) it is possible to find the large list of controls used. 
 On the other hand, NOCO-4 and COMP-4 do not hold the parallel-line assumption 
for some key coefficients. The result table indicates which are those coefficients. 
 Finally, all the regressions have the same weighting and clustering specifications to 
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obtain unbiased results and accurate errors. It is possible these characteristics in the 
appendixes (APPENDIX 3). 
 
SECTION 3: RESULTS 
 
 In this section, we present the regressions previously described, and a preliminary  
analysis of the results obtained. Here, we will just show which variables determine the 
position of y*, indicating their coefficients, z-values and whether they violate the parallel-
line assumption. We will denote y as “income”, its interaction with the ideology index as 
“income·ideo”, the interaction of income, ideology index and year variables as 
“year·income·ideo”, etc... 
3.1 Result table 
<<Table 2>> 
 
 
3.2 Analysis 
 With the previous table it is possible to analyze the evolution of y* in the income 
scale. Recall that we will compute the y*  with: 
 
y*(ideo)= - (β
 5+ β 7 ·ideoc,t +δ·ti,c,t + η·P  )/ ( 2·β6) 
 
 In general, a positive coefficient for  δ or η  will shift the y* to the left on the income 
scale, towards the richer individuals, if t and P increase. For instance the coefficient of 
year·income·ideo is greater than 0 meaning that every year the y* move to the left (i.e 
politicians maximize the happiness of richer individuals continually). Remember that 
variable income was computed in an eleven step scale. We have parametrized the 
distribution function of the variable income in order to extend the range to the infinite 
(APPENDIXES 7). In order to help the reader with the interpretation of coming results, we 
present here the distribution of income for BASIC-4, YEAR-4, NOCO.4 and COMP-4 
 
<<GRAPH 4>> 
 
 This is the distribution function of the income-scale. For instance, when we mention 
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that the distance between Center-Left and Center-Rigt parties is 4,2 points, we should 
imagine these distance in the horizontal axis of the previous graph. With this in mind we 
can present here the results: 
 
 Result 1: There is not statistical difference on the individual that different political 
parties represent once in power, although in some regressions this difference is large. 
 The variable income·ideo2 is insignificant in 4 out of 6 regressions. Only NOCON-4 
and COMP-4 show a significant coefficient. In those regressions the coefficient does not 
satisfy the parallel-line assumption, and we must take it with caution. 
 The other coefficients are statistically insignificant but in the case of the regressions 
BASIC-4 and YEAR-4 they are large. The distances between y*'s in the different 
regressions are shown in the next table. 
<<Table 3>> 
 Result2: Politicians have maximized the happiness of richer individuals during the 
period of study. 
 In both regressions the coefficient year·income·ideo is positive and significant. Each 
model shows a different evolution of y*. Actually, the displacement is double for YEAR-4 
than for YEAR-3.  
<<Table 4>> 
 The difference may come due to the fact that the combined database (happiness in 
3 steps) includes a large number of observations of Center Europe for the period 1981-
1986. According to several scholars those countries followed a different democratic 
evolution than Japan, USA, Oceania or South Europe (Crouch 2004) 
 
 Result 3: Increases in the percentage of rents paid as wages and salaries, and the 
level of affiliation to labor unions are correlated with governments that maximize the 
happiness of poorer individuals. 
 We can calculate how an increase of 1% on the values of these variables shift the 
position of y* for COMP-4. Countries where workers obtain a larger share of the national 
rent and countries present governments that maximize the happiness of the poorer. 1% of 
increase on these variables shifts more than one point the y* in the income scale . From 
that perspective, changes on labor union affiliation are much moderated.  
<<Table 5>> 
 We can also analyze how y* changes with changes of one standard deviation of the 
 14 
variables of interest. In that case we see how the change in the share of wages is also 
more important than the other. 
 
SECTION 4: DISCUSSION. 
 
4.1 Picturing democracy and representation. 
 Until this point we have described how politicians maximize the happiness of certain 
y* individuals due to several factors. In this section we will illustrate the evolution of the 
political representation over time. Concretely, how the y* for different parties over the 
period of study. It is important not only to know the evolution in the income scale but also in 
the income distribution function. 
 According to YEAR-3 and YEAR-4, politicians would maximize the happiness of the 
following income percentiles at the beginning and at the end of the period of study. 
 
<<Table 6>> 
 
 As we can see, since the eighties there has been a lack of political representation. 
Furthermore,  the data shows an extreme situation in 2009. Independently of the 
regression used we see how all political parties in power maximized the happiness of the 
richest individuals. In both regressions, we see how politicians maximize the happiness of 
the 95th - 100th richest percentile. 
 This fact has already been denounced by many authors, who have tried to explain 
the reasons of this evolution. Colin Crouch (2004) explained how the relative 
impoverishment of workers, and the weakness of labor unions favored the rise of post-
democratic governments (ie. a government for and by the rich). The coefficients of 
wagessh·income·ideo and labor·income·ideo may stand for this idea. These coefficients 
show how societies with relative poorer workers (relative to capitalists) and weaker labor 
unions coincide with politicians that maximize the happiness of richer individuals. 
 Crouch also explained how developed societies come closest to democracy in its 
maximal sense after in the seventies. We cannot test this idea directly with the data as the 
databases analyze the period 1981-2009. In any case, we can extrapolate backwards the 
results obtained to the seventies to observe the positions of the different political parties. 
 Graph 5 and Graph 6 show the income percentiles that different political parties 
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have maximized during the period of study (1981-2009) and they also include an 
extrapolation (dashed in blue) till the moment that center governments represented the 
median voter2.   
 
<<Graph 5>> 
 
<<Graph 6>> 
 
 
 As we can see, according to YEAR-3 and YEAR-4 the political situation in the 
seventies is extremely similar to the description made by Crouch (2004). 
 
4.2 Limitations 
 Even if the paper is able to show the huge democratic deficits of developed 
countries, it fails in explaining the circumstances that have provoked this situation. It is true 
that the coefficients of the regression COMP-4 are compatible with the theses of some 
authors, but unfortunately, the coefficients just show correlation between y* and macro 
variables, not the direction of the causality. 
 With the results obtained we could think that labor unions stop prevent the 
politicians from favoring the economic elite, but it could be that countries with politicians 
who favor the elite, create policies which weaken the labor unions. Similarly, it is possible 
that countries with relative rich working classes are able to keep healthy democracies, but 
it could also be that politicians who favor the richer take measures capable to worse the 
economic situation of workers. This paper describes effectively the lack of democratic 
levels but has its main limitation when trying to point out the causes of this situation. 
 We could understand better the direction of the causality by including newer waves 
of the World Values Survey. Unfortunately, larger databases are more likely to generate 
problems with the parallel-line assumption. 
 Finally, we would like to stress that both BASIC-3 and YEAR-3 present a very 
peculiar selection of countries surveyed. Whereas WVS tries to have a fair representation 
of the World, the data used from Schmitt (2011) considers only EU-12 countries for the 
                                                 
2
 We consider that a democracy has a representative government when center parties represent the 
median voter. A formal discussion is included in the appendixes (APPENDIXES 8) 
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period 1981-1986. This fact may generate the econometric differences shown in the result 
table. On top of that, WVS suffered an important manipulation of the dependent variable 
when we merged it with Schmitt (2011), as explained previously. 
 
4.3 Robustness checks: 
 To sustain the validity of the previous results, we have carried out a long list of 
robustness checks. Here, we will explain in detail those three that we consider more 
important: The power of the polynomial, the lack of control for education levels, and the 
symmetry-assumption. The rest will be commented at the end of this subsection and 
shown in the appendixes (APPENDIXES 4).  
 
4.3.1 Power of polynomial: 
 The regression assumes that utility function of a given individual is linked with a 
polynomial of power two, recall: 
ui ( yi , xk) = a·yi + b·y2i - ( ideo + ideo2) ·( d·yi - xk)2 
 and it is estimated with 
 PUideo = β 3·ideoct+β 4·ideo2ct+β5·ideoct·yi,c,t+β6·ideoct · y2i,c,t +β7·ideo2ct·yi,c,t  
 It is possible to argue that the polynomial has a higher power. This possibility has 
been analyzed by considering not only income·ideo and income2·ideo, but also 
income3·ideo and income4·ideo, in the BASIC3 and BASIC4 regressions.  
 As it can be seen in the appendixes (APPENDIX 5) these two variables are 
insignificant. The introduction of these variables creates also serious problems to full-fill 
the parallel-line assumption. On top of that, if we incorporate them in the analysis we 
would need to interact both time (t) and the macro-variables (P) with them, making the 
analysis unnecessary complicated. For all these reasons, we have decided not to include 
them in the final regressions. 
 
4.3.2 Education 
 The final regressions do not include a control for educational levels. Unfortunately, 
the databases used do not provide educational information for all the individuals but only 
for around 60.000. It is possible to imagine that education influences income, happiness, 
and preferences for political parties. In order to measure the capacity of this variable to 
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change the results, we have carried out two regression only with the observations that 
include education information. The first one, EDUC, includes an education variable and the 
second one, NO-EDUC, does not.  
 As shown in appendixes (APPENDIXES 4) the introduction of measurements of 
education does not change the results. 
 
4.3.3 Symmetry 
 The values given to center-right, center and center-left governments are 2,3 and 4, 
respectively. Therefore, the model assumes that the distance between center-left and 
center ideologies is equal to the distance between center and center-right. We call this 
consideration the symmetry-assumption. It is a strong assumption that may drive the 
results.  
 It is possible to break the symmetry-assumption by adding of subtracting points to 
the value given to the Center party. For instance, we can give the value 2.5 (-0.5) to Center 
and see if the regression fits better.  
 In order to analyze systematically the value of Center parties that fits better the 
model we have replicated the YEAR4 regression modifying the value of Center parties with 
a set of values. Those values are {-0.9, -0.75, -0.5, -0.25, -0.1, +0, +0.1, +0.25, +0.5, 
+0.75, +0.9}. We carried out an information criteria analysis and the model with the lowest 
value would be the best one. According to the information criteria analysis, the best fit 
occurs with Center having value 3 (+0), meaning that symmetry is preferred. 
 Even when using the other values for Center parties, the final coefficients does not 
change significantly. A summary of this check can be found in the appendixes (APPENDIX 
6). 
 
4.3.4 Other robustness checks: 
 We have also analyzed the possibility of a significant variable for income2·ideo2; the 
interactions between age, gender and income; between ideo and employment dummies; 
between income and employment dummies; the use of dummies for ideo values; we have 
also measured the ideology of the parliament not only by the ideology of the present party 
but also considering the ideology of the previous parties in government; we have split the 
database by years, and we have tried several heteroskedasticity functions, finally we have 
checked if the income distribution is homogeneous over time. 
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 None of the the previous checks provided a better outcome for the regressions and 
we have discarded them. Nevertheless, it is possible to find a more detailed explanation 
on the appendixes (APPENDIXES 4). 
 
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION. 
 The aim of this paper was to picture the quality of developed democracies and its 
evolution over time. The first novelty is the technique used. Although the theory about 
electoral competition and utility maximization of political parties was part of the literature 
since 1957, this is the first attempt to empirically measure the political representation of the 
individuals with different income levels using happiness surveys. 
 But without any doubt, the most important contribution of this paper are the results 
obtained. These results support the ideas of those authors who perceive serious deficits in 
present democratic systems and all of those that demonstrate on the streets shouting 
“They do not represent us”. 
 The results also show how countries with impoverished working classes have 
politicians that do not defend the interest of the many but the desires of the few. The paper 
also describes how politicians take into account the needs of poorer individuals in when 
the working class is stronger. 
 Unfortunately, and in spite of these correlations, we are not able to explain the 
circumstances that brought developed societies to the low democratic standards that they 
are suffering. Therefore, we have to rely on the theory previously exposed to understand 
the direction of the causality. 
 This paper leaves many questions unanswered, mainly: the potential differences 
between ideologies and the causality direction of the correlations or the role of other 
variables in determining y*. This leaves the door open for further research. Fortunately, the 
continuity of the World Values Survey will create larger databases and more accurate 
results. Potentially, the use of IV methods that may help us to understand better some of 
the results obtained.  
 In the mean time, social groups are becoming more aware of the low quality of their 
democracies. This may help to change the direction of the results, bringing the levels of 
representation to those enjoyed in the seventies. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
 
APPENDIX 1.  
Country and year observations for the two data-sets: 
 
WVS. Happines in 4-steps scale 
 
Austria: 1990, 1999, 2008 
Australia: 1981, 1995, 2005 
Belgium: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2009 
Cananda: 1982, 1990, 2000, 2006 
Swizerland: 1989, 1996, 2007, 2008 
Germany: 1990, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008 
West-Germany: 1981 
Denmark: 1981, 1989, 1999, 2008 
Spain: 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007, 2008 
Finland: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009 
France: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008 
Great Britain: 1981, 1990, 1998, 2006, 2009 
Greece: 1999, 2008 
Ireland: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2009 
Iceland: 1984, 1990, 1999, 2009 
Italy: 1990, 1999, 2005, 2009 
Japan: 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 
Luxemburg: 1999, 2008 
Netherlands: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008 
Norway: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2008 
New Zealand: 1998, 2004 
Portugal: 1990, 2008 
Sweden: 1982, 1996, 1999, 2006, 2009 
United States: 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 
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WVS and Eurobarometer. Happines in 3-steps scale 
 
Austria: 1990, 1999, 2008 
Australia: 1981, 1995, 2005 
Belgium: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 1990, 1999, 2009 
Cananda: 1982, 1990, 2000, 2006 
Swizerland: 1989, 1996, 2007, 2008 
Germany: 1990, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2008 
West-Germany: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 
Denmark: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1999, 2008 
Spain: 1981, 1985, 1986 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007, 2008 
Finland: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009 
France: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008 
Great Britain: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1998, 2006, 2009 
Greece: 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 1999, 2008 
Ireland: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 1990, 1999, 2009 
Iceland: 1984, 1990, 1999, 2009 
Italy: 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 1990, 1999, 2005, 2009 
Japan: 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 
Luxemburg: 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 1999, 2008 
Netherlands: 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1990, 1999, 2006, 2008 
Norway: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2008 
New Zealand: 1998, 2004 
Portugal: 1990, 2008 
Sweden: 1982, 1996, 1999, 2006, 2009 
United States: 1982, 1990, 1999, 2006 
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APPENDIX 2. 
Variables description 
 
<< SET OF TABLES 1>> 
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APPENDIX 4. 
Extra robustness cheks. 
 
Variable income2ideo2 
 
 This variable would allow the parabolas of different parties to have different width. 
Political utility would de defined as: 
 PUideo = β 3 ·ideoct+β 4 ·ideo2ct+β5 ·ideoct yi,c,t+β6·ideoct·y2i,c,t +β7·ideo2ct·yi,c,t  
 and then: 
y*(ideo)= - (β
 5+ β 7· ideo  )/ ( 2 (β6 + β8· ideo) ) 
 
 This variable is insignificant, breaks the parallel-line assumption and makes the 
analysis much complicated, as more interactions are required. 
 
Interactions of age and gender with income. 
 
 These interaction variables are insignificant, and they are not included. 
 
Interactions of employment and ideo 
 
 These interaction variables are insignificant, and they are not included. 
 
Interactions of employment and income 
 
 Most of these interaction variables are mainly insignificant and BIC analysis suggest 
not to add them.  
 
Variable year·income·ideo2 
 
 We have checked whether the distance between political parties varies across time. 
The results suggest that it is not the case. 
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 If we add the variable year·income·ideo2 to YEAR, and COMP regressions, we see 
how it is insignificant. 
 
Time lags 
 
 We have also considered the possibility that previous political actions may influence 
present happiness. It can be that decision taken by previous governments have a strong 
effect in present happiness, or that the measurements of current governments need a time 
to affect individual happiness. 
 To control for that we have created a new variable ideom3 that is the average of the 
ideology in government of the year of the survey and the previous two years. We have 
substituted the different interactions of the old variable ideo with the new ideo3m and we 
can see how the fit of the regression is clearly inferior. 
 Notice also that only 1/4 of the values of ideo change.  
 
Use of dummy variables for ideology 
 
 Another suggestion has been to substitute the ideo variables for dummy variables 
for each of the ideologies. We have created the variables ideo1 ideo2 ideo3, and we have 
proceed as usual. The outcome violates strongly the parallel-line assumption. The only 
advantage that could be obtain with this procedure is the plausibility of relaxing the 
symmetric assumption, but even the analysis described on the paper shows that the 
assumption must be maintained. 
 
YEAR split ups. 
 
 It may be interesting to analyse if year·income·ideo varies across time. Namely, if 
the speed of movement of the peaks varies during the time of the sample. We Have 
analyse the YEAR-4 regression by incorporating a variable year·income·ideo·h1997 . 
h1997 is equal to 0 if the year was equal or below to 1997 and equal to the year if the year 
was higher than 1997 (half of the observations are influenced by this variable). 
 It make sense to use only the original WVS as Eurobarometer has a very concrete 
set of countries analized for the period 1981-1986. 
 The coefficient of year·income·ideo·h1997  is insignificant. 
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Heteroskedasticity function 
 
 We have tried other forms of heteroskedasticity. We tried to include gdp, gini, and 
income·ideo do to their capacities of highly influence the results. Other functions have 
been rejected due to their requirements of computational power. All the coefficients of 
these variables are insignificant when in the heteroskedasticity function. 
 
Distribution of income 
 
 Here is the mean and the median for income in a year basis. As we see there are 
not time-tendencies. 
 
<<Table 7>> 
 
Education 
Similarities of results when taking into account educational levels 
 
<<Table 8>> 
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APPENDIX 5. 
Detail: size of polynomial 
 
 
 Comparison between BASIC regression and the same regression with the inclusion 
of income3ideo and income4ideo, labeled as EXTEND. 
 
<<Table 9>> 
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APPENDIX 6. 
Detail: Symmetry-assumption 
 
 The values that determine the y* on the YEAR regression are: income·ideo, 
income·ideo2, income2·ideo and year·income·ideo. Here we show the coefficients for 
these variables for different values of Center. The IC analysis for each regression is also 
shown. 
 
<<SET OF TABLES 2>> 
 
 The following graph summarizes the BIC analysis for different values of Center 
parties. 
<<Graph 7>> 
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APPENDIX 7. 
Distribution function of income 
 
 
 We have modified slightly the distribution functions of income, to go beyond the 11th 
step of the income scale.  For doing so, we have standardized the distribution function of 
income to a negative binomial distribution that takes into account its mean and 
overdispersion. These two parameters are fore each database: 
 
<<Table 10>> 
 
 Following graph shows that distribution function for the two databases (happiness in 
a 3-step and 4-step scale) 
<<Graph8>> 
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APPENDIX 8. 
Democratic representation 
 
 The aim of this paper is to analyze the quality of representation of developed 
democracies. We will briefly establish a normative benchmark describing how should be a 
good representative democracy. The purpose of this appendix will not be to describe the 
logic of real electoral process, or the possibilities of a political party to win given certain 
conditions. Instead, we will describe a normative ideal view of how political parties should 
behave in a truly representative democracy. 
 In an ideal democracy: “elections are not just a race that some win at the expense 
of others, but a way of participating in the creation of the representative body” (Urbanati 
and Warren 2008). In fact, John Stuart Mill, one of the fathers of the liberal democratic 
thought, considered that an optimal democratic system is such that “every opinion which 
exists in the constituencies obtains its fair share of voices in the representation” (Mill 
1861). 
 We can model these ideal views in our model, recall: 
 Let be K political parties that must choose a policy xk characterized in the set X.  
And there is a number N of i citizen-voters, each voter has a type zi such that h(zi ) =  τi  , 
where τi  represents the preferred policy of i. The set of τi is Τ = X. 
 The utility of the voters is given by a function of their type f(zi) and the distance 
between their preferred policy and xk the policy selected by the party in government: 
ui ( τi , xk) = f(zi) - ( τi - xk)2 
 Let now consider that τi has a density function g( τi ), and a distribution function G(τi).  
  We can consider the weighted i individual as: 
wi ( τi , xk) = g( τi )/(f(zi) - ( τi - xk)2) 
 The mathematical problem to locale optimally xk , by maximizing the social welfare 
function Wi, the sum of the wi weighted individuals: 
 This problems are well known in the economic literature since the work of Hotelling 
(1929). The general solution can be found in (Revelle, Marks & Liebman 1970). 
Concretely, to obtain a fair and efficient representation, the positions must divide G(τi ). in K 
+ 1 equal parts. The position of xk in Τ is, therefore: 
xk (Τ, K) =  G-1(2k -1 /2K) 
where G -1(τi ) is the inverse of the distribution function G(τi ).  
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 We can tabulate the position of center-left, center and center-right3 parties for 
different values of K.  
<<Table 11>> 
 
 As we can see the best way of measuring whether there is a good level of 
representation is to analyze whether center parties maximize the utility of the median voter 
(0,5).  
                                                 
3
 We consider center-left and center-right to the immediate inferior and superior k parties to the median of 
K 
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Downs model visually 
 
 
 
  
 
GRAPH 2 
Explaining the econometric model 
 
  
<<GRAPH 3>> 
Relationship between the latent variable Y* and Y. 
 
 
 
  
 
<<Table 1.>> 
Distribution of happiness for WVS and Eurobarometer 
WVS 4-Step scale  Eurobar. 3-Step scale 
 Freq. Percent  Freq. Percent 
Very happy 33530 30,98 Vary Happy 13170 22,78 
Quite happy 63852 59 Happy 33578 58,09 
Not very happy 9448 8,73 Not Happy 11055 22,78 
Not happy at all 1393 1,29    
TOTAL 108220 100 TOTAL 57803 100 
 
  
 
 
<<Table 2>> 
Results table 
Ordinal generalized logistic model. Dependent variable: Level of Happiness. 
 
 
BASIC-4 BASIC-3 YEAR-4 YEAR-3 NOCO-4 COMP-4 
income·ideo 0,08 
(0,94) 
0,11 
(1,27) 
0,05 
(0,57) 
0,09 
(1,03) 
0,52 † 
(3,02)*** 
1,02 
(3,59)*** 
income·ideo2 -0,01 
(-0,77) 
-0,007 
(-0,52) 
-0,009 
(-0,70) 
-0,009 
(-0,76) 
-0,028 †† 
(-2,45)** 
-0,046 †† 
(-2,88)*** 
income2·ideo -0,002 
(-0,97) 
-0,007 
(-2,36)** 
-0,002 
(-0,80) 
-0,006 
(-2,00)** 
-0,002 
(-0,89) 
-0,002 
(-0,76) 
 
      
year·income·ideo   0,0013 
(2,16)** 
0,0017 
(2,96)*** 
0 
(-0,03) 
0,0003 
(0,27) 
wagessh·income·ideo     -0,413 
(-2,41)** 
-0,402 
(-3,26)*** 
labor·income·ideo      -0,03 
(-1,16) 
-0,054 
(-1,67)* 
Controls interacting 
with income·ideo NO NO NO NO NO YES 
R2 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,14 
N. Observations 103984 161339 103984 161339 103984 103984 
 Note: Coefficients denote the probabilities of being happier for an increase of 1 point of a given 
variable.  Coefficients are followed by †† if the brant test is significant at a 1%, and † if it is significant at a 
5% (violation of parallel-line regression). z values are included under the coefficients in parenthesis, *** p< 
.01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for two-tailed tests.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
<<GRAPH 4>> 
Density function of income in WVS database 
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<<Table 3>> 
Distance between Center-left and Center-right parties 
 BASIC-4 YEAR-4 BASIC-3 YEAR-3 
Distance between CL and CR 4,2 4,7 0,8 1,5 
 
 
  
 
<<Table 4>> 
 Shift of y* for the period of study (1981-2009) 
 YEAR-4 YEAR-3 
Displacement of y*  9,3 4,1 
 
  
 
<<Table 5>> 
Correlations between y* and statistically significant variables 
 Increase of 1% Increase 1 st. dev. 
Wages share (wagessh) -1,17 -6,28 
Affiliation to Labor Unions (labor) -0,15 -3,4 
 
 
 
  
 
 
<<Table 6>> 
Percentiles represented by politicians of different ideologies. 
 Center-Right Center Center-Left 
YEAR-3 
1981 0,83 0,76 0,66 
2009 0,98 0,97 0,95 
YEAR-4 
1981 0,94 0,80 0,48 
2009 1 1 1 
 
 
 
  
 
 
<<Graph 5.>> 
Percentile represented by different political options according to YEAR-3 
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<<Graph 6>> 
Percentile represented by different political options according to YEAR-4 
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<< SET OF TABLES 1>> 
Variable description 
 
Main variables from WVS 4-Step data-set 
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      income |    108223     5.32804    2.518458   .8333333         11 
        parl |    107184    2.878293    .8290044          2          4 
         gdp |    108223    2.857797    .8294909        1.3       7.38 
     wagessh |    108223    .5951313     .053495       .459       .723 
     turnout |    108223    .7804567    .1067069      .4225      .9575 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      growth |    108223    .0205479    .0295204      -.084       .099 
       labor |    108223    .3639272    .2166133       .076        .93 
       unemp |    108223    .0750684    .0372259        .02       .227 
        gini |    108223    .2949596    .0412372         .2        .39 
     unieduc |    108223    .4986948     .194867       .105       .919 
 
             |   income     parl      gdp  wagessh  turnout 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
      income |   1.0000 
        parl |  -0.0039   1.0000 
         gdp |   0.0627   0.0369   1.0000 
     wagessh |   0.0251  -0.0767  -0.4516   1.0000 
     turnout |   0.0006  -0.0428   0.0006  -0.2073   1.0000 
      growth |  -0.0955   0.1005  -0.0505  -0.0862  -0.1348 
       labor |   0.0696  -0.0270   0.0074  -0.1314   0.2492 
       unemp |  -0.0956   0.1977  -0.4129   0.0695   0.0626 
        gini |  -0.0345   0.0379  -0.1539   0.0640  -0.1791 
     unieduc |  -0.0159   0.0335   0.2587  -0.2849  -0.0499 
 
             |   growth    labor    unemp     gini  unieduc 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
      growth |   1.0000 
       labor |  -0.0585   1.0000 
       unemp |  -0.0354  -0.2017   1.0000 
        gini |  -0.0137  -0.6469   0.3487   1.0000 
     unieduc |  -0.1869   0.0451   0.0073   0.0749   1.0000 
 
 
Main variables from WVS and Eurobarometer, 3-Step data-set 
 
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      income |    166360    5.277903     2.53724   .8333333         11 
        parl |    166360    2.827212    .8397685          2          4 
 
 
  
 
<<Table 7>> 
 
Year mean and median of income for 4-Steps database 
 
Year mean income median income difference 
1981 6,17 6 0,17 
1982 5,3 6 -0,7 
1984 6,04 5 1,04 
1989 5,02 6 -0,98 
1990 4,7 5 -0,3 
1995 5,03 5 0,03 
1996 5,31 5 0,31 
1997 4,77 5 -0,23 
1998 5,98 6 -0,02 
1999 5,12 5 0,12 
2000 4,66 4 0,66 
2004 6,46 7 -0,54 
2005 5,08 5 0,08 
2006 4,82 5 -0,18 
2007 5,18 5 0,18 
2008 4,14 4,16 -0,02 
2009 5,91 5,83 0,08 
 
 
  
 
<< Table 8>> 
 EDUC NO-EDUC 
incomeideo 1,32 
(2,59)*** 
1,34 
(2,69)*** 
incomeideo2 0,966 
(-2,46)** 
0,965 
(-2,58)** 
income2ideo 0,993 
(-1,72)* 
0,994 
(-1,67)* 
 
  
yearincomeideo 1 
(0,38) 
1 
(0,17) 
N. Observations 65431 65431 
R2 0,15 0,15 
Note: Coefficients denote the probabilities of being happier for an increase of 1 point of a given variable. 
Numbers above 1 means that the happiness is positively correlated with the variable. The opposite works for 
values below 1. z values are included under the coefficients in parenthesis, *** p< .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 for 
two-tailed tests.  
  
 
<<Table 9>> 
 
 BASIC-4 BASIC-3 EXTEND-4 EXTEND-3 
incomeideo 1,08 
(0,94) 
1,11 
(1,27) 
0,964†† 
(-0,32) 
0,884† 
(-0,82) 
incomeideo2 0,99 
(-0,77) 
0,993 
(-0,52) 
0,981†† 
(-1,37) 
0,985 
(1,07) 
income2ideo 0,998 
(-0,97) 
0,993 
(-2,36)* 
1,06 
(-1,74) 
1,096† 
(1,60) 
 
    
income3ideo 
  0,992 
(1,68) 
0,987† 
(-1,66) 
income4ideo 
  1,0004 
(1,63) 
1,0006† 
(-1,66) 
R2 0,14 0,16 0,14 0,16 
Numer observations 103984 161339 103984 161339 
Note: Coefficients denote the probabilities of being happier for an increase of 1 point of a given variable. 
Numbers above 1 means that the happiness is positively correlated with the variable. The opposite works for 
number below 1. Coefficients are followed by †† if the brant test is significant at a 1%, and † if it is significant 
at a 5% (violation of parallel-line regression).  z values are included under the coefficients in parenthesis, ** 
p< .01; * p < .05 
 
 
 
  
 
 
<<SET OF TABLES 2>> 
 
    happy   |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
CENTER = 2.10 
 
income~2p210 |   .9516794   .0786595    -0.60   0.549     .8093494    1.119039 
in~eideop210 |   1.342796   .6725581     0.59   0.556     .5031229     3.58382 
income2i~210 |   .9984047   .0022656    -0.70   0.482     .9939741    1.002855 
yearbinc~210 |   1.000867   .0005153     1.68   0.093      .999857    1.001877 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93310.07     79     186778.1    187532.7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CENTER = 2.25 
 
income~2p225 |   .9788476   .0337164    -0.62   0.535     .9149459    1.047212 
in~eideop225 |   1.133709   .2407508     0.59   0.555     .7477275    1.718937 
income2i~225 |   .9983132   .0023294    -0.72   0.469     .9937582    1.002889 
yearbinc~225 |   1.000936   .0005307     1.77   0.077     .9998969    1.001977 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93306.63     79     186771.3    187525.9 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CENTER = 2.50 
 
income~2p250 |   .9877473   .0187821    -0.65   0.517     .9516126    1.025254 
in~eideop250 |   1.072829   .1296506     0.58   0.561      .846571    1.359558 
income2i~250 |   .9981869   .0024033    -0.75   0.451     .9934876    1.002908 
yearbinc~250 |   1.001057   .0005548     1.91   0.057     .9999697    1.002144 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7    -93301.9     79     186761.8    187516.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CENTER = 2.75 
 
income~2p275 |   .9902346   .0143443    -0.68   0.498     .9625156    1.018752 
in~eideop275 |   1.055535   .0994767     0.57   0.566     .8775117    1.269674 
income2i~275 |   .9981029   .0024278    -0.78   0.435     .9933558    1.002873 
yearbinc~275 |   1.001175    .000576     2.04   0.041     1.000046    1.002304 
 
  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7      -93299     78       186754    187499.1 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
CENTER = 2.90 
 
income~2p290 |   .9907808   .0132516    -0.69   0.489     .9651455    1.017097 
in~eideop290 |   1.051218   .0920663     0.57   0.568     .8854093    1.248077 
income2i~290 |   .9980764   .0024166    -0.80   0.426     .9933512    1.002824 
yearbinc~290 |   1.001241   .0005869     2.12   0.034     1.000092    1.002392 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93298.38     78     186752.8    187497.8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CENTER = 3,00 => SYMMETRY 
 
income~2p300 |   .9909014   .0129289    -0.70   0.484     .9658824    1.016568 
in~eideop300 |   1.049885   .0897204     0.57   0.569     .8879737    1.241318 
income2i~300 |   .9980685   .0023986    -0.80   0.421     .9933785    1.002781 
yearbinc~300 |   1.001283   .0005932     2.16   0.030     1.000121    1.002446 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7    -93298.5     77       186751    187486.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
CENTER = 3.10 
 
income~2p310 |   .9908518   .0128906    -0.71   0.480      .965906    1.016442 
in~eideop310 |   1.049639   .0891445     0.57   0.568     .8886864    1.239742 
income2i~310 |   .9980683   .0023725    -0.81   0.416     .9934292    1.002729 
yearbinc~310 |   1.001321   .0005985     2.21   0.027     1.000149    1.002495 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93299.06     78     186754.1    187499.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CENTER = 3.25 
 
income~2p325 |   .9904371   .0133984    -0.71   0.478     .9645218    1.017049 
in~eideop325 |   1.051484   .0918205     0.57   0.565     .8860781    1.247768 
income2i~325 |   .9980806     .00232    -0.83   0.408     .9935437    1.002638 
yearbinc~325 |   1.001372   .0006046     2.27   0.023     1.000188    1.002558 
  
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93300.74     78     186757.5    187502.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
CENTER = 3.50 
 
income~2p350 |   .9883592   .0164796    -0.70   0.483     .9565819    1.021192 
in~eideop350 |   1.063733   .1109697     0.59   0.554     .8670306    1.305061 
income2i~350 |   .9981276   .0022044    -0.85   0.396     .9938163    1.002458 
yearbinc~350 |   1.001434   .0006085     2.36   0.018     1.000243    1.002628 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93305.68     79     186769.4      187524 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
CENTER = 3.75 
 
income~2p375 |   .9808984   .0280855    -0.67   0.501     .9273678    1.037519 
in~eideop375 |   1.112504   .1929596     0.61   0.539      .791888    1.562929 
income2i~375 |   .9981996   .0020661    -0.87   0.384     .9941582    1.002257 
yearbinc~375 |   1.001467   .0006041     2.43   0.015     1.000283    1.002651 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93312.85     77     186779.7    187515.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
CENTER = 3.90 
 
income~2p390 |   .9578551   .0636841    -0.65   0.517     .8408272    1.091171 
in~ eideop390 |   1.282828   .5115315     0.62   0.532     .5871499    2.802771 
income2i~390 |   .9982508    .001978    -0.88   0.377     .9943816    1.002135 
yearbinc~390 |   1.001471   .0005976     2.46   0.014       1.0003    1.002643 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  103984  -107871.7   -93317.91     78     186791.8    187536.9 
 
 
  
 
<<Graph 7>> 
Information-Criteria Analysis for the symmetry-assumption. 
BIC value minus 187.000 
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<<Table 10>> 
Income distribution for the two databases 
 Distribution function 
Income 3 - Steps 4 - Steps 
1 0,07617 0,04785 
2 0,22326 0,16546 
3 0,42248 0,33098 
4 0,60000 0,50594 
5 0,74123 0,66025 
6 0,84165 0,78013 
7 0,90746 0,86487 
8 0,94796 0,92053 
9 0,97167 0,95499 
10 0,98501 0,97533 
11 0,99225 0,98686 
12 0,99608 0,99318 
13 0,99805 0,99653 
14 0,99905 0,99827 
15 0,99954 0,99916 
16 0,99978 0,99959 
17 0,99990 0,99980 
18 0,99990 0,99990 
 
 
  
 
<<Graph8>> 
Income distribution functions for the two databases 
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<<Table 11>> 
Normative positions of political parties in G(τi )  
 K =2 K = 3 K = 4 K = 5 
Center - Left 0,25 0,16 0,37 0,3 
Center  -- 0,5 -- 0,5 
Center - Right 0,75 0,83 0,63 0,7 
 
 
